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DDTa b s t r a c t
I address questions about values in model-making in engineering, speciﬁcally: Might the role of values be
attributable solely to interests involved in specifying and using the model? Selected examples illustrate
the surprisingly wide variety of things one must take into account in the model-making itself. The notions
of system (as used in engineering thermodynamics), and physically similar systems (as used in the physical
sciences) are important and powerful in determining what is relevant to an engineering model. Another
example (windfarms) illustrates how an idea to completely re-characterize, or reframe, an engineering
problem arose during model-making.
I employ a qualitative analogue of the notion of physically similar systems. Historical cases can thus be
drawn upon; I illustrate with a comparison between a geoengineering proposal to inject, or spray, sulfate
aerosols, and two different historical cases involving the spraying of DDT (ﬁre ant eradication; malaria
eradication). The current geoengineering proposal is seen to be like the disastrous and counterproductive
case, and unlike the successful case, of the spraying of DDT. I conclude by explaining my view thatmodel-
making in science is analogous to moral perception in action, drawing on a view in moral theory that has
come to be called moral particularism.
 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science1. Introduction
That the practice of science involves values and norms is no
longer in question. At least, my starting point here is that that ques-
tion is already settled. The question can be pushed farther down,
though, to the level of speciﬁc activities involved in scientiﬁc prac-
tice. The question concerning the role of values and norms then
arises for one of the most ubiquitous activities in the practice of sci-
ence:model-making. Does it make sense to ask questions about the
role of values and norms for such technical aspects of the practice of
science? Assuming that it does, we can go on to ask: Are there some
such activities for which values and/or norms are especially or more
intimately involved? At the other end of the spectrum, are there any
such activities that do not involve values at all?
For this symposium, I thought through these questions for mod-
el-making,1 and, as a result, came to see model-making as, in somecases, akin to moral perception; to put it more precisely, I came to
seemodel-making in science as analogous tomoral perception in action
on the account of it given by the philosophical view known as moral
or ethical particularism.2 In this paper, I will try to explain how I
came to this view.
2. Model-making: impact and nature
There are reasons to suspect at the outset that model-making
might involve values and norms. For, model-making is employed
in describing and conceiving and, consequently, might be expected
to have an impact on actions taken. Common sense and critical
examination of life experiences are probably sufﬁcient to indicate
that this is indeed the case, but there is also some experimental re-
search in the behavioral sciences that illustrates the existence of
what have become known as framing effects: the phenomenon that
32 S.G. Sterrett / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 46 (2014) 31–45people choose differently depending upon the descriptions used to
present the choices available to them. Experiments designed to ex-
hibit such effects have been carried out for groups reaching a
group decision, as well as for individuals making a choice. In-
structed to indicate their choice, which option people say they pre-
fer is sensitive to how the options presented to them are parsed and
described; it is sensitive to how situations are characterized in the
experiment, it is sensitive to the consequences that are identiﬁed
in presenting the issue in the experiment, and, even, to the perspec-
tive (individual, group) from which the consequences are described.3
How things are conceived of, evidently, makes a difference to what
people would choose, at least within the constraints of, and when
conﬁned within, the laboratory.4 Of course, how individuals act out-
side the laboratory may well differ in some ways from the behavior
they exhibit in the laboratory situation set up in order to make pre-
dictions, so caution is in order when predicting actual behavior
based on such experiments. Nevertheless, these experiments are
informative on more general points. The general point I take from
this experimental work is that they conﬁrm that how an agent re-
sponds to a situation can depend upon how the agent conceives of that
situation. As models are means of conceiving things (entities, situa-
tions, processes, etc.) model-making can, accordingly, have an
impact on what agents do. That models have such consequences
indicates that it is unlikely that model-making can be decoupled
from values.
Other hints that model-making might involve values or norms
come from the practical experience of those who have made mod-
els. It is part and parcel of model-making, whatever the ﬁeld, and
for almost every kind of model, that one must make choices about
what the model is to include. There is generally going to be more
than one way to model a given thing, situation, or process. This
simple fact raises the question of what kinds of constraints or
norms, if any, are employed to winnow down or rank the different
ways one could make the model.
Yet, one could ask, even if values and norms are involved in
the use of models, does this fact alone really determine the an-
swer to the question as to whether model-making necessarily in-
volves values and/or norms? On reﬂection: no, it doesn’t. We
might try distinguishing between what’s involved in the model-
making from what’s involved in using the model. Once we do,
we see that the fact that values and norms are involved in the
use of models alone doesn’t rule out the possibility that the mod-
el-making activity itself could be decoupled from speciﬁcations
about what the model is to accomplish. Speciﬁcations for the
model could be developed with the use to which the model is
to be put in mind. So, decoupling looks possible. In fact, some
might ﬁnd it quite natural to wonder if it is not the case that
all values and norms associated with the use of models are due
to interests or values that can be identiﬁed either before the mod-
el-making occurs (i.e., in the speciﬁcation of the problem that the
model is made to help deal with) or after the model-making is
complete (i.e., in using the model as a guide to what actions
one will take).
To help gain some clarity on this, let us look more carefully at
just what is involved in model-making. I’ll begin by ﬁrst examining
models of some relatively circumscribed targets: models of ma-
chines. Then, I’ll look at examples of models constructed for use
in engineering the environment. Finally, I’ll look at some proposals
for engineering the planet.3 There is a large literature on framing effects; a recent review is Stalans (2012). Paese, Bie
Druckman (2001) proposes a method of evaluating the strength of framing effects due to
4 The design and interpretation of many of the experimental studies meant to present
work have sometimes been rightly criticized. However, I think the fact that framing effects e
5 Also discussed in Sterrett (2006).3. An engineering model of a machine is never a model of just a
machine
Since we are interested in examining the objection that the
activity of model-making might be separable from interests, and
that the source of values and norms that show up in the course
of model-making are all attributable to the interests involved in
either the speciﬁcation or use of the model, let us begin by looking
at cases towards the end of the spectrum where model-making is
most circumscribed.
Consider the following example: making a full-scale reproduc-
tion, i.e., replica, of the original 1903 Wright Flyer.5 This is a mod-
el-making task in which the target is relatively well deﬁned and the
goal of the model is deﬁned sufﬁciently clearly that choices about
how the model is to be made are relatively constrained by the prob-
lem deﬁnition. To draw out the point I want to make here about engi-
neering models (versus physical replicas), let’s clearly distinguish two
different problem deﬁnitions.
Problem R (Make a Physical Replica of a Machine): Produce a
physical object that is as close as possible to being exactly like
the physical object that existed in 1903 now known as ‘‘The
1903 Wright Flyer’’ in terms of the physical properties it had
when it was built and ﬂown in 1903.
Problem E (Make an Engineering Model of a Machine): Pro-
duce a physical setup that allows one to determine the dynamic
behavior (e.g., the forces, deﬂections, and motions) of the 1903
Wright Flyer during the ﬂights that were made in it in 1903.
Neither problem is unusual, and each involves modeling with his-
torical accuracy (i.e., one of them is to model a physical object that
actually existed at one time; the other is to model behavior (posi-
tion, momentum, forces) during an event that actually took place).
Different interests sometimes call for different problem charac-
terizations, even for the same event or topic under investigation:
Problem R is the appropriate problem statement, were someone
to commission a work for a museum aimed at exhibiting a certain
machine that once existed, with historical accuracy. Problem E is
appropriate were someone to want to recreate selected scientiﬁ-
cally-relevant aspects of the events in the historical record that
the original researchers would have experienced when carrying
out the experiments their notebooks indicated they carried out
with that same physical machine. It is easy to conﬂate Problem R
and Problem E.
Are these necessarily different model-making problems?
Couldn’t one model satisfy both of the problems set? The answer
is that even if the same physical object that constitutes a solution
to Problem R can be used in a solution to Problem E, the problems
are really quite different and the models meeting those problem
speciﬁcations are not comparable. So the answer is that they are
in fact different model-making problems.
Perhaps some explanation is in order here. Since an engineering
model is concerned with behavior, anything relevant to behavior is
part of the model speciﬁcation. The behavior of interest in Problem
E (the engineering model) is similarity of processes, in that the
model is to produce, possibly after rescaling, the same forces,
deﬂections, and motions as the historical event. The behavior of
interest in Problem R (the reproduction, or replica model) is to
make a working replica. Now, one might think that making a work-
ing replica just is making a model that behaves the same way, butser, & Tubbs (1993) discuss the relation between individual and group framing effects.
a particular frame.
particular instances of framing effects and establish claims about the mechanisms at
xist and are frequently operative is well established. That is all I am relying upon here.
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tionship that exists between the larger system that determines
the physical replica’s behavior, and the physical replica itself. That
relationship is crucial; to leave it out is to specify only part of the
model. To explain: engineering models aim at similarity of a cer-
tain speciﬁed physical behavior or response. Thus engineering
models must include all the things that determine that physical
behavior or response—even if only as variables that take on differ-
ent variables for different cases.
(For readers to whom this point is still unclear, perhaps the fol-
lowing analogy may be helpful: If the speciﬁed physical behavior
that one is interested in modeling depends upon something that
is not included in the model, making the model that way is as
though one answered a question by producing a string of words
that would make a sentence if only the right kind of verb were
placed at just the right place. To justify giving such a response to
a question by saying, ‘‘Well, the ordered string of words gives the
same result as the correct response if the same word is added to
it at exactly the same spot as it occurs in the correct response, so
my response really behaves the same way as the correct answer
does in each case—and therefore it really is the same sentence as
the correct response’’ is to misunderstand what a reply to a ques-
tion is supposed to do. Even if one wishes to give a reply in which a
verb is to be left unspeciﬁed due to wanting to cover a multiplicity
of cases, simply leaving the verb out does not indicate that the nat-
ure of the reply depends upon a verb, nor how it does so.)
What if one were to deﬁne a new problem that encompasses
both Problem R and Problem E as speciﬁed above? Something like
that approach was taken by the project called The Wright Experi-
ence, and here is how it actually proceeded: The project was in-
spired by the conviction that ‘‘The best way to rediscover how the
Wrights accomplished [their] incredible achievement in so short a
time is to experience ourselves what the Wrights experienced.’’
The scope and depth of the model-making project was astounding.
In the actual project that was carried out, the attempt at replication
was so thorough that period tools were made so that the replica
machine would be constructed using tools of the same size, materi-
als, and construction as the tools used in constructing the original.
Testingwas carried out using bothwind tunnel and ﬂight tests.6 The
human-machine interaction aspect was thoroughly studied and rep-
licated as well: the same pieces of equipment that the Wright Broth-
ers had practiced on prior to the ﬁrst trial of their 1903 Flyer were
also painstakingly replicated and tested, so that their twenty-ﬁrst
century counterparts could learn about and train on the same ma-
chines as those who had ﬂown the machine in 1903 had.
One of the replicas was built to be ﬂown in celebration of and on
the 100th anniversary of a ﬂight in 1903 made by the original 1903
Wright Flyer. The 100 year difference in time certainly shouldn’t
matter to how the machine functions. Yet, when the time ﬁnally
came to launch it on that day in 2003, it did not ﬂy as it had on
the day in 1903 one hundred years before. Why the difference, if
the model of the plane was practically a perfect replica, the human
interaction as closely replicated as possible, and the location about
the same? Simple: the weather was very different on the two days
(the one on 17 December 1903 and the one on 17 December 2003),
and the replica, of course, replicated only the machine and the
manipulation of its moving parts controlled by the pilot. The scope
of the replica model (Problem R) did not, of course, include the
surrounding atmosphere; a proper speciﬁcation of its behavior in6 According to The Wright Experience (2012).
7 I provide a discussion and more detail on the deﬁnition of dynamic similarity in my othe
Flies A Kite: A Story of Models of Wings and Models of the World (Sterrett, 2005). Basically, whe
geometrically similar (i.e., that ratios of distances traveled and ratios of velocities in the targ
model and target systems are similar (i.e., that ratios of forces are preserved).
8 ‘‘The Flyer in Flight—2003.’’ The Wright Experience (2004).ﬂight would, of course, include a characterization of it that in-
cluded all the features of the atmosphere that determined the ma-
chine’s behavior that was of interest. Thus the model-making
activity associated with Problem R did not distinguish between sit-
uations that would yield ﬂying behavior similar to the original
1903 event, and those that would not.
As a replica of a physical object to exhibit as a museum piece, the
replica model may well be an excellent example of model-making.
The replica machine was even presented in a replica of its scientiﬁc
context, in that it was ﬂown by pilots trained on replica or vintage
ﬂyers of the era, and was accompanied by the presentation of a
great deal of information about how the inventors’ thinking about
the machine evolved as they developed and tested prototypes in
succession, up to and including the 1903 Flyer. However, as a model
of a replica of a functioning ﬂying machine, the physical replica of a
machine, as sophisticated as this one was, is an inappropriate no-
tion of model. The scope of the model of the replica machine would
need to be expanded in order to make it an appropriate model of a
functioning ﬂying machine.
Just how would one expand the scope of the model to include
the surrounding atmospheric conditions, and in a way that ensured
the ﬂying behavior would be similar to the original 1903 event?
What the model-maker would need to be able to do is establish cri-
teria for physically similar situations. This is not only possible, but
the methodology for this kind of case is relatively well established;
the kind of similarity that matters to ﬂying behavior is dynamic
similarity.7 Often dynamic similarity cannot be achieved by any
model except a full-size one; but this replica was a full-size model,
so such an analysis might have been possible; instead of choosing
to hold the event on the same day of the year, it could have been held
when atmospheric conditions were similar to the event in 1903 in the
ways speciﬁed by the engineering model. The way that the atmo-
spheric conditions ﬁgure in the model-making is via the criteria for
dynamic similarity. These criteria are expressed in terms of certain ra-
tios of quantities that one aims to make invariant between the model
and the target situation. The ratios will involvemeasurable quantities
having to do with atmospheric conditions (e.g., pressure, tempera-
ture, and humidity) as well as quantities having to do with the phys-
ical features of the aircraft. That is, the criteria of similarity are that
the important relationships holding in the original event also hold
in the replica constructed by the model-makers. The model-makers
recognized this, in a way—reporting on the event in retrospect, they
point out that they re-enacted a different event than the one the 2003
ﬂight was meant to commemorate: ‘‘Our attempt at ﬂight on Decem-
ber 17, 2003 replicated almost exactly the Wright brothers’ ﬁrst pub-
lic attempt at ﬂight, May 23, 1904. Lack of wind, engine trouble, and
Wilbur got as far as the end of the rail . . .and went nowhere.’’8
This point about the scope of a model is not special to the ﬁeld
of ﬂying machines. I ﬁnd the building of the replica of the 1903
Flyer a striking example of a more general point. Put informally:
An engineering model of a machine is never a model of just the
machine.
Consider model-making of the classic simple machines, which
may at ﬁrst seem to be paradigmatic examples of models of just
a machine, e.g., the pendulum, the spring, or the lever. The pendu-
lum is anchored, though, as is the spring, and the lever must be
provided with a fulcrum of some sort. If we consider simple
models such as the billiard ball model of a given volume of gas
molecules, we see that it is crucial that the billiard balls be in ar works, especially Sterrett (2002, 2006, 2010), and in Chapters 6 and 7 ofWittgenstein
reas kinematic similarity ensures that the motions of the model and target systems are
et are preserved in the model), dynamic similarity ensures that the forces between the
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constrained by the walls of a container. What about things for
which the system boundaries can be chosen, and so represent
merely conceptual boundaries, such as the control volume concept
in thermodynamics? It may seem at ﬁrst as though the idea of a
control volume liberates us from having to consider the surround-
ings of a system we wish to study, since, once the boundaries
around the system are chosen, all one need consider is what
crosses those boundaries. The twist is in how the boundary must
be chosen if one is to have a good model of a system one wishes
to analyze. Misconceptions about the leeway a model-maker has
in choosing system boundaries are all too common. Often people
think of the boundary of a control volume or a system as a surface
like the wall of a balloon, i.e., that the value of a property on one
side of the boundary differs from the value on the other side, with
the boundary serving to demarcate a discontinuity. But nothing
could be further from the truth when it comes to correctly choos-
ing a system boundary of a system for engineering analysis. Adrian
Bejan explains what’s involved in properly selecting the boundary
between a system and its environment:
‘‘To deﬁne the system means also to identify sharply the sys-
tem’s environment, or surroundings. The environment is the
portion of matter or region in space that resides outside the sys-
tem selected for analysis. What differentiates between the sys-
tem and its environment is the surface called boundary . . . the
boundary is a surface, not another system . . . the value of a prop-
erty that is measured at a point on the surface called boundary
must be shared by both the system and the environment
because, after all, the system and the environment are in con-
tact at that point.’’ (Bejan, 2006, pp. 1–3)
This clariﬁcation of how an engineering system boundary must be
deﬁned is really a more general way of expressing the points made
earlier about models of simple machines and systems such as the
pendulum, spring, lever, and ideal gas in a chamber. It shows
why, I think, we cannot in general expect to be able to understand
or explain physical behavior by mentally decoupling engineering
systems from their environments, i.e., by making a model of ‘‘just
the machine.’’ It’s because system boundaries don’t allow one to chop
the engineering system off from the rest of the world for analysis; they
make sure the role of the environment is included in the model so that
one can do the analysis correctly.
I want to emphasize that the point just stated about system
boundaries holds even for the kind of systems known as closed sys-
tems in thermodynamics. To explain: a distinction is made in engi-
neering between closed systems and open systems: ‘‘A system
deﬁned by a boundary impermeable to mass ﬂow is a closed sys-
tem . . .systems whose deﬁning boundaries can be crossed by the
ﬂow of mass are open systems, or ﬂow systems.’’ (Bejan, p. 3) Flow
systems are qualitatively different than closed systems, to be sure,
and they deserve a whole ﬁeld of study of their own. Nevertheless,
because there can be energy exchanges across the boundary of a
closed system, the point just made in the previous paragraph about
the boundary of a system ensuring that the role of the environment
is appropriately included in the deﬁnition of the system applies to
closed systems as well as to open systems.
4. Engineering design & human behavior: how far must the net
be cast?
So far we have said little about the humans in the surroundings
of the machines being modeled. If we are discussing a machine9 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ‘‘Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Sys
10 ‘‘Description of the Safety Concern; PWR Sump Performance.’’ nrc.gov. Nuclear Regula
schematic showing the role of the sump screen pre- and post-accident operation.such as a lever or a hammer, a human might be involved via
mechanical contact with the machine by touching or grasping it,
say—much the same way that, for a pendulum, an inanimate object
in its surroundings would be involved in mechanical contact with
the pendulum (e.g., if the pendulumwas supported by an anchored
hook, say). Thus the study of human-machine interaction is impor-
tant in a proper analysis of many machines, even from a purely
mechanical standpoint.
If we stick to the purely mechanical standpoint, what difference
does it make if there are humans or not, from the point of view of
performing an engineering analysis? It might seem that during the
model-making, the role of the humans in the environment will be
simply whatever role they have in virtue of the mechanical or
physical effects that their presence and actions have. This may well
be true, but even if it is, it leaves unanswered another question
having to do with identifying the engineering system that is to
be analyzed: how far out do we have to look to make sure that
we have gone far enough to include all the relevant factors in the
analysis of an engineering system? That is, suppose we have cor-
rectly identiﬁed the boundary of our system. We now know what
the points of contact between our system and its surrounding are.
The question we are faced with at this point is: What do we need to
know in order to be able to properly characterize everything that
we should take into account at these points of contact?
The same questions arise for writing speciﬁcations in design
engineering, except that there they take the form of asking how
far one must extend the net in order to capture all the factors that
must be speciﬁed as part of the model of that machine, in order to
ensure that it performs the function for which it was designed. For
an engineered object, these questions arise both when we are mod-
eling the envisioned object in order to write proper design speciﬁ-
cations for it, and (all too often) afterwards, when it is already in
use and we need to troubleshoot or answer new questions about
its behavior. A particular design problem of general signiﬁcance
that is well-suited to illustrating the predicament that a model-
maker faces is the design of nuclear power plant containment
sump screens.
First, a few facts about nuclear power plants to set the stage for
a discussion about containment sump screens: nuclear power
plants are designed such that, for certain kinds of accidents, the
containment (the structure in which the nuclear reactor is housed)
is isolated from the rest of the plant, in the sense that ﬂows into
and out of the containment are cut off.9 There are a few exceptions,
e.g., venting operations; and incoming ﬂows that provide water
needed for accident mitigation to ensure reactor safety. Water is in-
jected into the reactor, and, since there is no way for it to leave the
containment after the containment is isolated, any water that leaks,
is ejected, or otherwise spills out of the reactor system stays in the
containment building.10 At some point, no more additional water
is to be injected into the reactor (you wouldn’t want to keep adding
water to the containment indeﬁnitely; since ﬂowpaths out of the
containment are all isolated, the containment would ﬁll up). At this
point, the emergency safety pumps stop injecting new water. In-
stead, the water that is already inside the containment is pumped
to the reactor core—it will by this time have collected in the sump
area, so as to be ready at the suction of the emergency safety system
pumps when needed.
In terms of basic physical conﬁguration, containment sump
screens are quite simple. They are just screens. Their function is
pretty straightforward, too: to screen debris in order to prevent
it from entering the safety pumps, which are critical to reactor
safety. During this phase, they suck ﬂuid from the sump area oftems. Regulatory Guide 1.141.’’ April 1978.
tory Commission, (2011) Web, downloaded 28 March 2013. This webpage features a
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the decay heat from the fuel. As to the question of enumerating
all that could affect the ability of the screen to perform its intended
function, the answer is not straightforward. The question of how
far the net must be cast, so to speak, arises. Thus, it turns out that,
if we ask how one ought to specify the important features of its de-
sign, the answer is not at all deﬁnite. What counts as part of the de-
sign has been a matter of contention, even among experts with
experience. Everyone agrees that the screen is needed in order to
keep debris from entering the pump suction: that’s the reason
for its existence and location. Everyone agrees that if too much
material of whatever sort has collected on the screen at some ear-
lier point in time, it can cause a lowering of pressure as the ﬂow
passes through the gunked-up screen at any later point in time.
This is a serious problem: the pump needs the pressure on its suc-
tion side to be above a certain threshold. There’s the rub: the same
containment sump screen that protects the safety pump and
everything downstream of it (including the reactor core) by pre-
venting debris from entering it can present a different danger to
the very pump it was designed to protect: should the screen be-
come clogged, the pump’s suction pressure might be lowered to
a point where there is danger of pump failure.
The contentious issue of what should be considered a design
feature of the sump screen has to do with the range of things that
could impact the ability of the screen to perform its intended func-
tion (screening debris but permitting ﬂuid ﬂow), for the range is
expansive and includes a lot of things in the plant that are other-
wise unrelated to each other. The usual things one takes into ac-
count in designing a screen are features of the screen itself, such
as hole size, strength, ductility, corrosiveness of the materials,
resistance to seismic disturbance, and so on. But, after the plants
were in operation, some of the unusual events observed at plants
showed that another likely source of blockage was due to a source
not considered in the original design conception of what a screen
ought to do. Some of the reduction in ﬂow through the screen
was due, not to large objects that could be kept out by appropriate
choice of hole size, but due to ﬁbers and sludge buildup that hap-
pened to be in the containment and got into the water when water
was sprayed or delivered by the emergency safety systems inside
the containment during an accident. The ﬁbers and sludge buildup
then make their way, along with the draining water, to the contain-
ment sump area. Many different kinds of objects: cleaning cloths
left in various areas; paint ﬂecks coming off during the accident
due to the severe conditions inside the containment; packing or
insulation becoming dislodged from some other piece of equip-
ment in the plant unrelated to the safety pumps; and so on, can
come to rest on the containment sump screen during the later,
recirculation phase of the accident and clog it up. Under the tem-
peratures and pressures possible during an accident, chemical
reactions can take place making things even worse for the sump
screen performance. Too much of this kind of debris caught on
the screen can result in such a low pressure at the pump suction
that the pump can’t operate properly, and can even damage itself
trying. Since the pump has to function during nuclear power plant
emergencies, stopping to clean or change out the sump screen is
not an option. The sump screen is on its own during an accident,
so to speak; there is no contingency plan possible. It has to perform
its function without causing ruin of the emergency safety system
pumps.
Thus begins the casting of the net to try to catch all the factors
relevant to the containment sump screen performance. What must
be included in the model of the screen the model-maker constructs11 The dimensionless parameters characterizing the system behavior of interest are of
geometrical similarity; a ratio of velocities for kinematic similarity; a ratio of forces, for dyn
it is not necessary to do so to use the criterion.and uses in order to specify the design features of the containment
sump screen? The design features are those that must obtain so
that the containment sump screen does the job of collecting debris
but does so in a way that does not impair pump performance. It is
only in the process of this model-making that the model-maker be-
comes slowly aware that specifying the amount and kind of things
that could reduce ﬂow through the screen, including things that
are not usually thought of as debris or loose objects, is part of
the design of the screen itself!
The model-making of the screen, an item so simple in physical
conﬁguration (i.e., an extremely simple machine), then gets
extremely complicated. How can the enforcement of cleanliness
standards and practices in parts of the building far away from
the screen be incorporated into the model and/or the design
speciﬁcations of the screen? It then becomes obvious that social
structures and administrative effectiveness are as crucial to how
well the containment sump screen performs during an accident
as equipment structures are, and that how reliably a plant’s clean-
liness rules are enforced is likewise as relevant to making a model
of how things will go in an accident as the reliability of its pumps
is.
The point generalizes: model-making in engineering analysis
has to take into account the nature and structure of the administra-
tive and social organizations that affect the surroundings of the
machine or system. What looks at ﬁrst like a straightforward mat-
ter of model-making in engineering design and analysis turns out
to be a matter of far wider scope. That scope includes things that
seem at ﬁrst to have little to do with something as simple as the
design of a screen, things that have to do not only with features
of other equipment in the plant otherwise quite unrelated to the
system of which the screen is a part, but that have to do with rules
about mundane day to day human activities throughout the entire
life of the plant seemingly unrelated to accident response, such as
cleanliness standards for the containment building.
5. Model-making and scope
From the two examples used so far (a replica of an early ﬂying
machine and a sump screen in a nuclear power plant), we’ve seen
that, if one is to do it well, the activity of model-making has to in-
volve looking beyond the physical boundaries of the item being
modeled. But, other than the discussion of how to select the
boundary for an engineering analysis properly, so far we’ve merely
looked at examples of how wide a scope might be needed. Is there
a methodology to follow to ensure one looks in all the right places?
Is there a criterion one can use to determine if one has looked far
enough?
Well, we know that there is a criterion for physical behavior:
the criterion of physically similar systems. The criterion for two
systems to be physically similar systems can be stated generally,
formally, and precisely: First, ﬁnd a convenient set of dimension-
less parameters that characterizes the behavior of interest (e.g.,
buckling, heat dissipation, patterns of ﬂow in porous media). This
is not straightforward, and can involve experimentation and trial
and error. The import of achieving this step is that two systems will
be behaviorally similar just in case the value of the dimensionless
parameters are the same in one system as in the other. The dimen-
sionless parameters are ratios and thus pure numbers.11 However,
identifying a criterion and applying a criterion are two different
things. The criterion, though, can be stated with precision.
Applying the criterion of a certain kind of physical similarity to
a particular model-making problem, however, requires drawing onten thought of as ratios of some meaningful quantities (e.g., a ratio of lengths for
amic similarity) as a help in cognizing and reasoning about the two situations, though
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built to address. This is not too surprising, once we reﬂect on the
status of the principle behind recognizing and establishing similar-
ity of systems. It is the logic of analogy spelled out for the case of
reasoning about physical behavior. Its status is that of a logical
principle; one might say that it is the logic of reasoning about
physical behavior. The criterion of physically similar systems just
stated is a more general version of the criterion referred to in the
discussion of the replica ﬂying machine. There, the criterion that
the model of the system be physically similar to its target was
the requirement of dynamic similarity between an event in which
the replica model was ﬂown, and the original event in which the
plane of which it was a replica was ﬂown. The tricky part of the lo-
gic of analogy (which system features should be the same in the
two situations between which the analogy is drawn?) is dealt with
by this criterion. Or, rather, it is reduced to a simpler question: if
one knows which quantities are involved in the relations governing
the behavior of interest, one can identify the dimensionless quan-
tities (ratios) that need to be the same in the model as in target in
order to be able to set up a correspondence between the quantities
in the model and the quantities in the target. This question is sim-
pler to answer, for all that is being asked is which physical quanti-
ties the physical behavior depends upon—not what the
dependence is nor what must remain invariant in order to preserve
the same behavior. The more fundamental question of which quan-
tities the behavior depends upon is not a matter of logic, however.
This is true even though the criterion can be stated in a logical
formalism.
Hence, in practice, although the criterion for (physically) similar
systems is indispensible in organizing one’s model-making efforts,
when used in conjunction with the points made earlier about prop-
erly deﬁning the boundaries of models used in engineering system
analysis, being in possession of the criterion for similar systems
does not obviate the need for experience and experimentation in
determining which quantities are relevant to characterizing the
system.
I have written extensively in other works on the history and the
philosophical signiﬁcance of the notion of physically similar sys-
tems for systems characterized by quantitative relations. (Sterrett,
2002, 2005, 2006) I believe the notion of physically similar systems
is a speciﬁc case of a more general logical criterion of what we
mean for one thing to be a model of another, even for non-quanti-
tative features of a situation. Howmight the notion of similarity be
stated for similarity in cases where we are interested in relations,
but the relations are understood and characterized qualitatively
rather than quantitatively, as ratios? I do not see why we cannot
appeal here to the notion of similarity that motivated development
of the formal criterion in the quantitative case: What makes a good
model good is that the behavior (of interest) of the model is similar to
the behavior (of interest) of what is modeled. The criterion that en-
sures that the behavior is similar is that the relations from which that
behavior follows in what is modeled be identiﬁed, and then shown to
also hold in the model.
‘‘Behavior’’ here can mean different things, and the criterion of
similarity of systems differs accordingly, depending on which par-
ticular behavior of the target one wishes to model. (The difference
between kinematic similarity and dynamic similarity was men-
tioned above, i.e., if the behavior that one wished to model was
the motions of items in the system but not necessarily the forces
on them, the kind of similarity the model ought to have to the tar-
get would be kinematic similarity; if, in contrast, the behavior of
interest was the forces produced, then the kind of similarity be-
tween the model and target to aim for would be dynamic similar-
ity.) I believe that the criterion provides some guidance in
model-making for cases where the behavior of interest is qualita-tive; the idea captured is that of being analogous with respect to
a qualitative feature. Thus, something like a good x or an effective
y, e.g., a good response to an opportunity, or an effective means of
stimulating growth.
Once this has been settled, the next step is to properly conceive
of what it is that is to be modeled. One way in which the criterion
provides guidance during model-making is that, in order to apply
it, the model-maker must deﬁne a system, in a precise sense of sys-
tem (i.e., the state of the system can be characterized in terms of a
set of quantities; any or all of the quantities may vary over time,
but whatever their value at a certain point in time, we consider
the values of them jointly to pick out a system state). For a non-
quantitative example, consider a qualitative feature of a certain
area of a city such as saying that the trafﬁc is ﬂowing smoothly,
versus that it is slow or jammed. We might want to characterize
such a feature in terms of what we would see at a snapshot in time
(car locations and speeds), or we might wish to characterize it in
terms of some more abstract quantity having to do with delays
people experience. There may be many different combinations of
vehicles at different locations going different speeds that would
constitute one of these states. Yet, the state (smoothly ﬂowing traf-
ﬁc) is determined by the locations and speeds of the cars. So, after
clarifying the behavior of interest, it is crucial to identify a system,
namely, the system that determines the behavior of interest. To
understand why this is a nontrivial requirement, consider how
the systems in the examples discussed (replica ﬂyer, sump screen)
had to be deﬁned in order to meet this requirement properly. The
main point made about proper selection of a system boundary (i.e.,
no discontinuities of relevant quantities at a boundary) then
applies.
We have seen that the scope of a model can, and often does, in-
clude the inﬂuence of features of social organizations. When this
does happen, then, as in the sump screen example, interests and
values are identiﬁed during the model-making itself. But some-
thing else can happen in the process of model-making. The person
doing the model-making is doing so in the service of modeling a gi-
ven target with respect to a certain behavior of interest. As we
might expect, the detailed model-making can provide feedback
about how the behavior of interest depends on various features
of the model. But, occasionally, the person carrying out the mod-
el-making also gains some insight about the model, the target,
and the behavior of interest that makes him or her question the
suitability, not of the model, but of the target. The model-making
points out a certain feature of the target, and questioning the suit-
ability of the target for solving the larger engineering problem that
occasioned interest in pursuing the problem in the ﬁrst place can
lead to a complete overhaul of the conception of the problem.
How common or rare this is is not our concern here—that it can
and does occur at times is germane to our question about values
and norms in model-making. We turn now to an important exam-
ple in which this really happened.
6. Better targets
The example in which the question of the suitability of the tar-
get of a model arose in the course of model-making itself con-
cerned the problem of developing an improved windmill to
transform mechanical energy in the wind into electrical energy.
The usual way of approaching the problem is to choose the wind-
mill as the engineering system to be analyzed, and to model differ-
ent possible windmill designs (e.g., to compare a horizontal-axis
style wind turbine (HAWT), in which the blade is mounted like a
pinwheel on its support, with a vertical-axis style wind turbine
(VAWT), in which the blade rotates in the same direction as a play-
ground merry-go-round does).
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model-making when wind turbine efﬁciency is the target? The list
would include things such as: accuracy (in the values of efﬁciency),
and the inclusion of uncertainty ranges when those values are re-
ported. We want the model-making to be thorough in considering
kinds of locales, the height of the windmill tower, the range of pos-
sible sizes and styles of blades. The study should also identify and
quantify the impacts on the environment and wildlife, as well as
the socio-economic impacts on humans, throughout its entire life-
span. We’d want our model-making to use a wide range of weather
conditions based on up-to-date information and, even, on future
climate projections. So far, we see no problem in capturing the
important interests in the problem speciﬁcation; all these goals
can be incorporated into the model-making activity.
That is, in fact, howmuch of the engineering modeling approach
to land-based wind turbines looked for a long time. But, in light of
recent work by a research group in engineering and applied science
directed by John O. Dabiri, even addressing all these interests
might not be aiming one’s efforts at the best target.
Dabiri explains what’s different about his current research in
wind energy: The usual starting point, he says, has been to focus
solely on the wind turbine efﬁciency. (Dabiri, 2011) When efﬁciency
of an individual wind turbine is what is identiﬁed as the behavior
of interest in making the model, and the model’s target is a single
windmill transforming mechanical energy of the wind to electrical
energy, the model-making enterprise focuses on the answer to the
question: ‘‘What fraction of wind energy ﬂux through the swept
area [of the rotating turbine blades] is converted to electricity?’’
Comparing a single horizontal-axis wind turbine (HAWT) with a
single vertical-axis wind turbine (VAWT), the result is clear: there
are HAWTs that are more efﬁcient than any VAWT, and they can be
built. This approach is very common in the design of electrical gen-
eration machinery: i.e., ﬁrst, the most efﬁcient type of a certain kind
of machine is determined (here, a HAWT), after which the maxi-
mum theoretically possible efﬁciency for the type of machinery that
was deemed to be the most efﬁcient type (here, a HAWT) is then
determined. The maximum theoretically possible efﬁciency is then
used as input to a calculation performed to provide an upper limit
to the maximum amount of wind power that can be extracted from a
wind resource (amount of power per unit of land area). For HAWTs,
this value is just under 60%, and is known by the name ‘‘Betz Limit’’
(short for Lanchester–Betz–Joukowsky Limit). As there has been a
lot of work directed towards maximizing the efﬁciency of wind
turbines, the current designs are not that far away from the Betz
limit and increasing the speed doesn’t improve it further. Thus it
doesn’t seem that there is much more that could be done. The Betz
Limit was regarded as a rigid limit and the other parameters asso-
ciated with optimized HAWTs were used to estimate how much of
the earth’s energy could be harvested by terrestrial wind farms.
Dabiri’s thoughts turned to the target of the model, rather than to
the model of the target. Instead of making turbine efﬁciency the
behavior of interest, he suggested, shouldn’t we instead make wind
resource utilization the behavior of interest? (Dabiri, 2011) Corre-
spondingly, he suggested, we should replace the old question
‘‘What fraction of the wind energy ﬂux through the swept area of
a wind turbine is converted into electricity?’’ with the new ques-
tion ‘‘What fraction of wind energy ﬂux into the wind farm volume
is converted to electricity?’’ Thinking in terms of the entire wind
farm as the target to be analyzed meant that his model could
now include parameters that models of the old target did not in-
clude: spacing of windmills and direction of rotation of the wind-12 A recent documentary (Windfall, 2012) gives voice to concerns residents near current
windfarm, gives an account of the social disruption that followed upon construction of wmills. The target of the model had to change, it seems, in order to
be able to include these parameters in the model.
Before, it seemed, the Betz Limit on a single turbine, multiplied
by the number of (suitably spaced) turbines that could be placed
on a certain expanse of land, would yield the total amount of elec-
tricity that could possibly be generated from a certain land area.
But on the new approach, with this new problem speciﬁcation,
alternative ways of seeing the potential in the same land area could
arise. Looking at the situation from the standpoint of the new ques-
tion, one could ask about the unharvested wind energy between
windmills. On the old approach, the optimized HAWTs had to be
spaced far apart so that the wake of one windmill would not impair
the performance of another, which meant that there was wind
power not being utilized between and behind the optimized HAW-
Ts in the usual wind farm layout. (Dabiri, 2011)
Nature often ﬁnds optimal solutions, or at least tends towards
them. How did nature deal with similar situations? Dabiri’s re-
search group saw an analogy between wind farms and schools of
swimming animals that propel themselves by tails or other
appendages. (Whittlesey, Liska, & Dabiri, 2010) They noticed that
the swimming animals did not need to stay far apart from each
other. And they noticed something else about them: they formed
a pattern of motion in which the swimmers did not all move in
the same exact way, but whose motions complemented each other.
Using the analogy in the direction from nature back to his problem
of wind farm design, he saw that the analogous approach on a wind
farm would be to use VAWTs that were a good deal smaller than
the large size that HAWTs needed to be to maximize their efﬁ-
ciency, locate these small VAWTs closer together, and let them take
advantage of each others’ wakes, by having each VAWT rotate in
the direction opposite to its neighboring VAWT. What I describe
informally here is stated more precisely in the published works
of Dabiri and his colleagues. They tested the biology-inspired de-
sign of wind farm layout; their pilot studies indicate that it may
well turn out to be that vertical and smaller wind turbines can
be placed much closer together than HAWTs, and that a windfarm
of smaller VAWTs can actually be more efﬁcient than a windfarm
of large HAWTs—in spite of the fact that an optimized single HAWT
is more efﬁcient that any single VAWT. (Dabiri, 2011)
There are many logistical, social and environmental beneﬁts of
smaller VAWTs, too. To be most efﬁcient, HAWTs have to be extre-
mely large—an order ofmagnitude larger. As a consequence, HAWTs
of the size called for by optimizing on a single windmill basis pose
logistical and maintenance problems (the blade alone is unwieldy
to transport)—not to mention the concerns about environmental
hazards towildlife. Because of their scale, the operationof these very
large windmills is disruptive to their immediate surroundings, and,
some even feel, can render the regions in which they are located
unsuitable for habitation by humans and some wildlife.12 Whether
or not farms of VAWTs are shown deﬁnitively to produce more elec-
tricity per land area, the lesson is that one must distinguish between
different ways in which a problem of energy resource use is ap-
proached, for the use of a different approach can have radically differ-
ent results. It now makes no sense to ask simply what the
environmental effects of wind power are; awindfarm of small VAWTs
looks to be far more benign environmentally than one of tall HAWTs.
The point of the example about thinking in terms of windfarms
instead of in terms of windmills for the question in this paper is
that interests can be clariﬁed—and might even be reformulated—
during model-making. It is worth emphasizing that, given that
the behavior of interest in the old problem was more narrowly cir-and proposed large HAWTs have expressed about this, and, in the case of a current
indmills on existing farms.
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lected horizontal axis wind turbines (HAWTs) as better was not a
matter of erring. It is not that those earlier researchers erred in
how they carried out their project; in fact, it was expertly executed
given the circumscribed problem statement. What Dabiri realized
was that there was another behavior of interest that provided a dif-
ferent target to be modeled, one that better addressed the genuine
interests of those interested in wind energy. That realization was
spurred by the similarity he recognized between an actual group
of swimming creatures moving together in each other’s wake in
the schools of ﬁsh he observed in nature, and the vision it sug-
gested of how an entire windfarm of wind turbines might be ar-
ranged. (Whittlesey et al., 2010)
7. Using similarity to suggest and evaluate solutions
Model-making is always carried out with respect to a behavior
of interest. In a rational reconstruction of a model-making activity,
the behavior of interest is speciﬁed ﬁrst. In reality, things are often
more like the windfarm example: there are subtleties about the
behavior of interest that are clariﬁed in the course of model-mak-
ing. How should this critical attitude towards the identiﬁcation
of a behavior of interest—i.e., the step wherein it is suggested that
thewind resource utilization of a windfarm replace the efﬁciency of a
wind turbine as the behavior of interest—be described? I believe it
can be very difﬁcult for someone making such a suggestion to get
this point across, because the behavior of interest is often put too
generally. In the wind example, someone already convinced that
the use of HAWTs is dictated by the fact that an HAWT can be
made to be more efﬁcient than a VAWT might not see that the dif-
ference between the more general speciﬁcation: ‘‘harvesting the
most energy from the wind’’ and the more particular speciﬁcation:
‘‘maximizing wind turbine efﬁciency’’ could make all the difference
in how the model-making will proceed.
What point ought we to draw from the windfarm example? It
might at ﬁrst appear that the point to draw is that a modeling
problem must be speciﬁed in more general, rather than more par-
ticular, terms, so as not to bias the model-making in a way that
precludes getting the best solution to a problem. However, notice
that, when characterized in more general terms (‘‘harvesting the
most energy from the wind’’), the modeling problem becomes
much less determinate; when speciﬁed in these more general
terms, the ﬁrst step to take in modeling the situation in order to
determine the best technological solution is far less clear. When
a problem is speciﬁed in more general terms, the activity of mod-
el-making requires much more of the speciﬁcation to be done by
the modeler; generalizing the problem is not really going to help
direct the solution. In the example described above, what directed
the solution was the modeler’s use of his creative intellect and
imagination in discerning the similarity between a ﬁsh propelling
itself through the ocean by the motion of its tail and a windmill
harvesting the energy in the motion of the wind. Then, he thought
to pay attention to how the ﬁsh moved with respect to each other
when traveling in the ocean in schools. These analogies and obser-
vations led him to frame the question that the model-making of
windmills ought to address very differently than others had
framed it before.
There is probably more involved than cognitive imagination,
though: Dabiri mentions the well-known drawbacks of the kind
of windmill considered optimal using the previous approach of
looking at the swept area of a single windmill (i.e., the extremely
large horizontal-axis wind turbines (HAWTs) mentioned earlier,
which need to be spaced far apart in order to achieve the efﬁcien-13 In Whittlesey et al. (2010).cies for which they were chosen). Some of these drawbacks involve
social and environmental impacts, and so have a moral dimension
to them. Thus, an openness to, a desire for, even a search for, alter-
natives to the decision methodology then in use that had given rise
to a solution that had such negative effects—not to mention the ac-
tive use of intelligence and creativity to formulate alternatives—is
probably due at least in part to a sensitivity to such moral aspects
of design decisions.
What kind of insight was called for in recharacterizing—we
might even say, in reframing—the design problem of ﬁnding the
optimal windmill style and arrangement? Recharacterizing the
problem in more general terms is a necessary step, very likely,
in that it opens the way to different design possibilities, but,
clearly, simply recharacterizing the problem of wind turbine opti-
mization in more general terms was not enough. It merely al-
lowed, but did not show the way, to the solution Dabiri and his
colleagues reached. The idea to consider counter-rotating wind-
mills and investigate advantages that might be gained by closer
spacing of windmills did not follow from the new problem spec-
iﬁcation—is there anything more speciﬁc we can say about its
genesis?
In the windfarm example, I think that what we see in this step is
the use of the concept of physically similar systems, albeit in a
more qualitative way, during the process of suggesting other
solutions. The role of facts in establishing similarity shows up on
this qualitative version, too: in order to discern the similarity of
two otherwise disparate situations (windfarm and school of ﬁsh),
one must cognize the situation in a way that the points of similar-
ity become apparent, and this may be a very different way of cog-
nizing it than one would use in simply enjoying the sight of a
tropical undersea landscape: different facts are used to establish
the similarity discerned. The similarity exists in spite of the fact
that there are points of dissimilarity between the two situations
that are important when considering other aspects of the
problem.13
It requires a more encompassing viewpoint, arising from a
deeper insight into each of the two situations, to discern that
there is a relevant similarity between a turbine vane rotating by
the force of the wind impacting upon it, and a ﬁsh propelling it-
self through the water by the force of its tail being swished back
and forth, and to recognize precisely what that similarity is. Once
one views the two situations in terms of relative motions, the rel-
evant difference between the old way of conceiving the problem
(an isolated windmill or, analogously, an isolated ﬁsh) and the
right way to see the ﬁsh situation (in terms of a school of ﬁsh,
in which the ﬁsh do not avoid each others’ wakes, but instead
take advantage of them by coordinating their movements by
swishing their tails in opposing directions), suggests a new sort
of conﬁguration of windmills on a wind farm, by the analogy
associated with that similarity. The cognitive step of seeing this
similarity may be motivated by moral sensitivity and may involve
mental imagination and creativity, but the logic used during the
model-making is still the logic of physically similar systems.
When it comes to computing optimal spacing, a different similar-
ity mapping is called for.
In the published journal article setting out the argument for the
feasibility of the new windfarm arrangement (Whittlesey et al.,
2010), the kind of behavioral similarity underlying the comparison
is noted: ‘‘Motivated by the demonstrated beneﬁts of the reversed
Kármán vortex street on the propulsion of the schooling ﬁsh, we
apply the same conﬁguration and similar modeling tools to analyze
VAWT [Vertical Axis Wind Turbine] arrays.’’ (ibid, p. 2; Fig. 1 on p.
3). Yet, in selecting the optimum spacing, it is noted that there are
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to align themselves to optimize their forward propulsion whereas
spatial conﬁgurations for turbine arrays aim to maximize energy
extraction.’’
I emphasize once again that similarity of systems is always with
respect to a behavior of interest, since the point bears emphasis:
when establishing similarity with respect to one aspect of behav-
ior, the systems might be similar, but when establishing similarity
with respect to another kind of behavior, they might not be similar.
We may have a model that is similar with respect to one kind of
behavior, and yet have to change the model in order to establish
similarity with respect to another kind of behavior—even for the
same target situation being modeled. There is absolutely nothing
contradictory about this. A very simple example of this is that in
building a simple physical model of a bridge, one may at ﬁrst build
one that is geometrically similar; in general it will not have the
same stiffness as the actual bridge. Any geometrically similar mod-
el should sufﬁce for purposes in which geometry is all that matters,
such as determining interferences with existing structures, and
calculating the surface area requiring painting.14 To make the mod-
el of the bridge similar with respect to bending behavior, however,
we would have to change the model by making it out of a material
that has different material properties than the actual bridge (e.g., a
material that is more ﬂexible and of a different density).15 Being able
to move between the use of different similarity mappings between the
same systems as required seems to me to be an essential part of prac-
tical reason.
There are a variety of very different approaches to ‘‘harvest-
ing’’ wind energy (more precisely, approaches to transforming
the mechanical energy of wind into electrical energy): another
quite different approach currently in the prototype and develop-
ment stage began with the idea of a ladder of kites ﬂown at high
altitudes, which would transform the mechanical energy from the
wind into rotational energy via the kites pulling on the cables to
which they were attached to machinery on the ground. During
modeling and prototype testing, the design was modiﬁed, and
by now has morphed into the idea of a controlled (steered) kite
or plane that is used to ‘‘harvest’’ the energy in the wind during
ﬂight. (Schmehl, 2012). Other approaches, in contrast, eschew
the quest for higher and higher altitudes and instead turn atten-
tion to the possibilities of generating electricity from lighter
winds.
The point of the windfarm example we have been looking at is
that, although the imaginative and creative steps required during
the process of model-making cannot be put into a prescription,
what we can say is that the logic of analogy, especially the logic
of physically similar systems, is still what is relied upon to get
things right. Sometimes ‘‘getting things right’’ is a matter of science
or engineering. Sometimes ‘‘getting things right’’ is realizing that
the characterization of the problem was too speciﬁc, or incorrect
in some other way. To return to the topic of this paper: does the
logic of analogy and similarity of systems apply in matters where
values are important; is it relied upon to ‘‘get things right’’ morally
or ethically speaking as well as technologically speaking? This is
what I now wish to explore.
8. Models of interventions
Since we are interested in if and how the logic of analogy and
similar systems plays a role in model-making where values are
important, we focus now on models of interventions. Models of14 Distances in the model would be multiplied by the scaling ratio to obtain the distanc
scaling factor to obtain the corresponding are in the target.
15 The ratios by which the quantities in the model must be multiplied to yield the value
parameters used to establish similarity have the same value in the target as in the modelinterventions are more akin to human action than models of
machines are; they involve conceptions of a situation and concep-
tions of taking action in such a situation.
First, we look at models of intervention aimed at engineering
the environment, identify their important features, and judge
how they fared. Then, we will ask whether, using the logic of anal-
ogy, these models provide us any guidance in making models for
engineering the planet (in an attempt to deal with the problem
of global warming). A well-known and well-studied example
where there are both good and bad models of intervention is the
use of pesticides. The use of DDT to successfully eradicate malaria
from some parts of the world provides us with a good model of
intervention that is detailed and very explicitly spelled out. (This
is not to claim that there is a good model for using DDT against ma-
laria in all parts of the world.) The use of DDT in failed attempts to
deal with the spread of the imported red ﬁre ant in the United
States provides an extraordinarily bad model of intervention. At
this point in my exposition, I am deliberately being ambiguous
about the sense of ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad.’’
The year 2012 saw a celebration of the publication of Rachel
Carson’s Silent Spring, which ﬁrst appeared as a commissioned
three-part series in The New Yorker in 1962. (Carson, 1962) The
background against which she wrote it involved two striking uses
of pesticides that could not be more different. The ﬁrst was the
eradication of mosquito-transmitted diseases such as yellow fever
and malaria; the second was ﬁre ant eradication.
It may well be that the two uses of pesticides were often spoken
of as being similar, in that eradication of a particular species of
mosquito identiﬁed as the vector of a particular disease was often
highlighted in the programs for eradicating yellow fever and ma-
laria. In the case of the malaria program, the pesticide DDT was
used to prevent the transmission of the malaria virus at least long
enough for the virus to disappear from an isolated population. The
model of intervention was very detailed: it included identifying the
habits and biology of various species of mosquitoes and identifying
which one or ones were responsible for transmitting the virus in
that region. The other mosquitoes could be neglected. In fact, it
was found that only the female mosquitoes were responsible for
transmission. Based on this information about mosquito habits in
the areas of Asia in which he worked, the following intervention
was designed: A very dilute solution of DDT was sprayed on the
interior walls of a residence from which all the eating and cooking
utensils had been removed; ingestion was avoided. Another impor-
tant aspect of the intervention was a criterion for when the spray-
ing could be stopped.
To the credit of the designer of the malaria campaign in the
1950s, Fred L. Soper, his diary reveals that he was constantly
inquiring about and pondering over new information about pat-
terns of transmission, traveling to outposts of his campaign and
taking note of local differences in the geography, in the political
structure of local populations, in evidence of resistance to the pes-
ticides used, and—most importantly for our interests here—con-
stantly evaluating what that information said about his
‘‘premise’’: ‘‘that DDT sprayed in the houses will result in the inter-
ruption of transmission.’’ (Soper, 1959a; February 28, 1959 entry).
The other important premise was that malaria would disappear
‘within a reasonable period of time once transmission had been
interrupted.’’ (March 19th entry).
The proper goal to focus on was eradication of malaria. Although
it often did sound as though the goal of malaria eradication pro-
grams was eradication of the mosquito or a particular species ofe in the target, whereas areas in the model would be multiplied by the square of the
s of the quantities in the target are obtained by using the fact that the dimensionless
.
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only insofar as the mosquito was involved in transmission.16 As
time went on, this realization become more and more acute. In
1959 Soper spoke of the ‘‘blurring of the immediate objective of
the eradication program, viz., the interruption of malaria transmis-
sion in each local community for the period required for spontane-
ous clearing of the infection in the human population . . . .’’ though
his point there was to discourage complacency when a disease
was merely still ‘‘disappearing’’, rather than completely eradicated.
After the malaria virus was gone, it could not be transmitted, no
matter what the mosquito population. That is why he so emphati-
cally emphasized eradication, not merely reduction, of the disease.
That 1959 Lecture, ‘‘The Epidemiology of a Disappearing Disease:
Malaria’’, ends with a warning: ‘‘total victory over malaria can come
only as there is total coverage of infected populations and as malaria
is not permitted to become a Disappearing Disease before it has been
eradicated.’’ (Soper, 1959b)
As with the containment sump design mentioned earlier, this
model of intervention depended upon (as Soper called them)
‘‘administrative procedures.’’ The malaria eradication was success-
ful in many areas. However, it failed in others. These, he concluded,
were due to ‘‘administrative failures’’, not technical ones. He men-
tions this factor throughout his 1959 Lecture. (Soper, 1959b) That
it is a longstanding view, one based on many local experiences, is
clear from comments found throughout his diary (e.g., ‘‘I ﬁnd my-
self giving a lecture on the need for supervision and more supervi-
sion until the Director of the Services who must take the
responsibility of signing the monthly reports can be certain that
the work [ ] at the end of the line, that is in the houses, has been
done.’’ (Soper, 1959a, February 18 entry)) A diary entry recording
his discussion of record-keeping when setting up a program in
Thailand shows where his focus lies: ‘‘the unit of interest is the
house, as the place where transmission occurs and is the unit of
spraying. The house also is ﬁxed geographically and can always
be found.’’ (April 11th entry).
So, as long as the premises of his model of intervention de-
signed for the areas covered by the campaign were met, he con-
cluded, the program would succeed in eradicating malaria.
However, he was perceptive enough to worry about using the
intervention in situations where the assumptions on which the ap-
proach was based did not hold, and of the danger of attempting to
use models of intervention that might not be applicable to those
situations. In his 1959 lecture, he notes the factors that he ex-
pected would make the problem of eradication of malaria in Africa
‘a formidable one’’: ‘‘the high rate of transmission, the shortage of
trained personnel and the difﬁculty of communications in many
parts’’. He seemed to think the time to attack the problem in Africa
had not yet come, and warned ‘‘against any attempt to eradicate
malaria on too limited a basis’’ as it could make things worse in
the long run, for ‘‘reinfection from the periphery may be expected
to be a more serious problem there than in other parts of the
world.’’ (Soper, 1959b, pp. 364–365) Yet he felt there were in prin-
ciple no technical factors to preclude malaria eradication in Africa,16 Gladwell’s tribute to Soper in The New Yorker (Gladwell, 2001) is titled ‘‘The Mosqui
eradication of a certain species of mosquito being only a means to the elimination of a di
absence of the A. aegypti mosquito was to emphasize the importance of tracking the disea
aware of the phenomenon of mosquitoes developing pesticide resistance, too, especially die
even the very diluted solutions than required and, when recommending its use in India, h
resistance had yet developed in the mosquitos there. (Soper, 1959, p. 363) Thus Gladwell’s c
His criticism reﬂects a common, but inaccurate portrayal of her writings: in actuality, not
transmission of malaria (Carson, 1962 I, p. 39), but the indiscriminate use of agricultural s
rather than ‘‘blanket spraying’’ Carson (1962 I, pp. 98–99)) is the cause of one of the bigges
et al., similarly misrepresent Carson when describing her ‘‘crusade against the use of pestici
in the 1950s there was clear evidence that mosquito resistance was evolving from agricu
because the larvae were present in bodies of water that became contaminated when DDT
17 Per ANR-1248, ‘‘Imported ﬁre ants can reduce populations of some other pests such athat his Malaria Eradication Program was still a sound approach, so
long as before applying it, the administrators ensured that all the
requirements needed for it to be effective, including all the admin-
istrative ones, were fully in place. Soper did mention one region of
the world where technical problems existed, though: in the Amer-
icas, there were serious difﬁculties with mosquito resistance to
DDT in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and some other countries. Near
the end of his speech, he indicated that the success of the Malaria
Eradication Program showed that the road was open for other
‘‘similar action on human, animal, and plant diseases, and insect
and plant pests’’, but the only examples he gave were of diseases.
In parallel with the successful model of intervention using DDT
in Asia in the 1950s, was a completely different use of DDT and
other, more potent, pesticides in the southeastern United States:
the USDA Fire Ant Campaign of the Late 1950s. The model-making
activity differed from Soper’s in key ways:
(i) This insect, often referred to as ‘‘the imported ﬁre ant’’ itself,
rather than any particular effect it caused or disease it trans-
mitted, was viewed as an enemy intruder to be eradicated.
In fact, Buhs (2002, p. 388) shows a poster in which the ﬁre
ant is depicted using the kind of graphics used in World War
II for depicting military battles;
(ii) Rather than being delivered in the light concentrations via a
powdered form that Soper used, which is a method that did
not harm those humans who came into bodily contact with it
(Carson, 1962 I, p. 39), in the Fire Ant Campaign, DDT and other
more toxic pesticides were delivered in high concentrations
and mixed with fuel oil so as to increase their bioavailability;
(iii) Rather than being delivered indoors and on a household by
household basis, the mixture in fuel oil was sprayed out-
doors over wide areas (tens of thousands of acres), including
private property. Thus, the cooperation of those being
affected was not needed in order to carry out the logistics;
(iv) Advice on selecting the suppliers and choosing the concen-
trations of pesticides to be used was provided by the corpo-
rate suppliers of the pesticides, and
(v) The fact that the use of pesticides was likely to result in
‘‘ﬂareback’’ of the insect population on which it was used,
as well as other insect populations, was neither recognized
nor addressed in the program. (Daniel, 1990)
The Fire Ant program was a failure in multiple ways. Whereas
Soper’s Malaria Eradication program was effective long-term in
many areas, the Fire Ant program was not, and it had devastating
effects on other wildlife and the ecosystem. Fire Ant Eradication is
not a feasible goal, and the proponents of the program had never
bothered to try to show that it could be a feasible goal. After the
Fire Ant Eradication program, the acreage of ﬁre ant infestation
actually increased. (Simberloff, 2007) Nor is eradication of the Fire
Ant even desirable: it turned out that, in spite of being imported,
ﬁre ants had become a valuable predator of ticks, and ticks
transmit disease.17 More recently, other beneﬁcial consequencesto Killer’’, but even in discussing the Yellow Fever campaign, Soper was clear about
sease; in fact, Soper’s important realization after Yellow Fever had reappeared in the
se even where A. aegypti was no longer present. (Soper, 1959, p. 360) Soper was well
ldrin; his use of DDT was not insensitive to this fact—he argued against using more of
e mentions as part of the basis for his recommendation that he did not observe DDT
riticism of Rachel Carson, as though her points are a contrast to Soper’s, is misdirected.
only did Carson fully recognize, and allow for, appropriate use of DDT in stopping the
praying that was the main target of Carson’s criticism (she urged ‘‘selective spraying’’
t impediments to malaria eradication today: resistance of mosquitoes to DDT. Roberts
des’’ (p. xi); they point out something that she was actually keen to urge as well: ‘‘Even
ltural use of DDT, . . . . Agricultural use of DDT selected for resistance in mosquitoes
was sprayed on crops.’’ (Roberts, Tren, with Bate, & Zambone, 2010)
s lone star ticks and forage-feeding caterpillar species.’’ (Flanders & Drees, 2004, p. 5)
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The proper goal, it is now recognized, is Fire Ant Balance.
Suitable farming practices and integrated pest management,
where pesticides are used only sparingly, if ever, and with focused
short term goals, is a far better approach even from the standpoint
of controlling the spread of the ﬁre ant. (Foil, 2010) The model the
USDA program used—indiscriminately spreading a bioavailable
toxin over every living thing in a wide geographical region in order
to kill as many ﬁre ants as possible—is inappropriate, and the mod-
el-making that gave rise to it was poorly done. The only hope of
making an appropriate model comes from understanding ﬁre ant
activities within an ecosystem that includes wildlife, humans,
and farming practices. (Simberloff, 2007) That is what would be
analogous to the approach that was used in developing the model
of intervention for the Malaria Eradication Program. The difference
between the kind of model-making that resulted in an inappropri-
ate model of intervention, and the kind of model-making that re-
sulted in an appropriate one for these two cases of engineering
the environment seem to illustrate the points made in Sections 3
through 5 of this paper about model-making in engineering. That
is, one must properly identify a whole system that is the subject
of the behavior in which one is interested.
These two extremes of programs using DDT and related pesti-
cides were two well-known cases of the use of pesticides already
in the social and technological background against which Rachel
Carson’s Silent Spring series was commissioned. There was already
outcry against the Fire Ant program, for multiple reasons: power
struggles between programs and bureaucracies led to calls for
investigations into the program, the harms to wildlife and ecosys-
tems outraged and alarmed conservationists who made their con-
cerns known to Congress and the public, and exposure of
intellectual dishonesty on the part of the Agricultural Research
Service arm of the USDA about the actual danger posed by the ﬁre
ant. (Daniel, 1990; Lear, 1992; Carson, 1962 II, pp. 57–64) Carson
was already among the voices challenging the USDA on its claims
that DDT and other, more toxic pesticides were not dangerous.
She had already collected information on scientiﬁc research on
such pesticides and was working on a book about it; her charge
for the commissioned New Yorker series was to write a piece that
reviewed the scientiﬁc literature about the effects of DDT and
other pesticides and to summarize the dangers in a way that
could be understood by the general public. (Lear, 1992) She ex-
plained the difference between effects of the DDT powder used
in malaria eradication and effects of the DDT mixed with fuel
oil and other, more toxic pesticides and then broadcast over vast
swaths of land. (Carson, 1962 I, p. 39) She explained how the
chemicals used in agricultural spraying of pesticides affected hu-
mans via the food chain and how the concentrations were enor-
mously magniﬁed when stored in the fat of animals higher up
in the food chain. Her target was the indiscriminate outdoor
spraying of large areas of the Southern United States. (Carson,
1962 I, pp. 98–99; II, pp. 52, 74) Using the perspective of the eco-
system of which the ﬁre ant was a part, she cited the scientiﬁc
research on such indiscriminate spraying, showing both its poten-
tial for harm to humans and wildlife, and its hopelessness in
achieving the stated goal of the ﬁre ant eradication program.
She recognized then what is no longer disputed: due to the com-
bination of the mechanisms of ‘‘ﬂareback’’ after the use of pesti-
cides (Carson, 1962 I, p. 36), and the development of resistance
to pesticides, widespread spraying of DDT would actually make
the ﬁre ant problem worse. (Carson, 1962 II, pp. 66, 74) Carson’s
concern was that the USDA was not properly informing the public
of the hazards of the program; the purpose was to relay to the
public what the scientiﬁc research showed. The point of writing
the piece was not, contrary to many current claims, to ban DDT
(Carson, 1962 III, pp. 66–67; Lear, 1992).It has been over ﬁfty years now since ‘‘Silent Spring’’ (Carson,
1962) was published. How do things stand now? With respect to
DDT, the ban on broadcast spraying of DDT remains, but limited
use of DDT indoors (Indoor Residual Spraying), which never went
completely out of use, has increased, due in part to the Bill and Me-
linda Gates Foundation’s support and funding for their Malaria
Elimination Group (MEG). There are, as Soper predicted, many
challenges (in Africa especially), and no single solution will sufﬁce.
(Shah, 2010; Nájera, González-Silva, & Alonso, 2011) Insect resis-
tance to the pesticides used is a salient issue (IRAC, 2012). Another
point being urged about making models of intervention for malaria
elimination illustrates a point made earlier in this paper about the
scope of engineering models: the need for ‘‘urgent strategic invest-
ment into understanding the ecology and evolution of the mos-
quito vectors that transmit malaria’’ especially ‘‘aspects of the
mosquito life cycle beyond the blood feeding processes which di-
rectly mediate malaria transmission.’’ (Ferguson et al., 2010)
What lessons can we draw from these examples of good and
bad model-making of models of intervention? The challenges in
2012 are different than they were in 1962; some are new, and,
ironically, one of them is the subject of a New Yorker article
appearing just a few weeks shy of the 50th anniversary of the
three-part ‘‘Silent Spring’’ essay. Once again, the intervention in-
volves spraying, but it is at the proposal stage. The article is ‘‘The
Climate Fixers’’ (Spector, 2012) and the proposal this time is to
engineer not just the environment (ecosystem), but to engineer
behavior at the planetary level. The suggestion is to reﬂect sunlight
away from the earth via spraying of aerosols in the atmosphere.
The line of thinking is as follows: carbon dioxide and other green-
house gases already released into the atmosphere will remain for
decades, and the change in climate they cause and will continue
to cause is dangerous. One quantity tracked to illustrate the
change—and the one that climate models are best at predicting—
is global mean temperature. One way to reduce global mean tem-
perature is to release aerosols (particles that stay suspended in the
air for some length of time) into the air. It is thought that pollution
in the past caused some solar radiation to be reﬂected away from
the earth, and that the reduction in pollution has led to the phe-
nomenon of ‘‘global brightening.’’ (This is, however, not an uncon-
tested account of the observed data.) It is also known that one
effect of the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991 was a reduction
in global mean temperature, due to the release of sulfate aerosols.
The temperature drop was signiﬁcant: about one degree Fahren-
heit. With this kind of sudden change in solar radiation, one would
expect changes in precipitation, too, since evaporative processes
upon which the hydrological cycle depends will be lessened. The
other problem is that the effect of the sulfate aerosols is short-
lived, and when their effect disappears in about a year or so, there
is a rapid increase of the opposite sort. Certainly the weather that
followed in the US in the two years that followed the eruption of
Mt Pinatubo was unusual with respect to precipitation patterns,
and, though it is never mentioned in discussions of climate engi-
neering that cite the eruption of Mt Pinatubo as a model for reduc-
ing global mean temperature, there did follow a major disaster of
epic proportions, one due to unusual precipitation patterns. In fact,
when it occurred, it set the record for the most expensive natural
disaster in the history of the United States: the Great US Flood of
1993. (Changnon, 1996; Des Moines Register, 1993; Larson,
1996) It lasted for many months, it killed dozens of people, and
it permanently displaced thousands. Current methods don’t permit
reliable prediction of the precipitation patterns that would follow
on attempts to engineer the climate by injecting sulfate aerosols
into the stratosphere; consequences due to its effects on precipita-
tion are not well understood.
Why the attraction to the eruption of Mt Pinatubo as a model,
then? It has to do with the fact that the global mean temperature
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the climate models predicted it would drop. But there is another
crucial part of the attraction: there is a tendency to think in terms
of ‘‘radiative forcings’’ in the design, application, and interpretation
of large computer models of global climate, and this encourages
thinking of blocking sunlight as ‘counteracting’ increases of carbon
dioxide. (National Research Council, 2005, p. 23)
Just as facts about ecology, geography and the life cycle of the
mosquito and the ecosystem were important in good model-mak-
ing of models of intervention on the environment, so facts about
the biosphere and global atmospheric physics will be important
here. Some basic facts are: (i) The ‘‘greenhouse effect’’ is crucial
to life; it is only because of greenhouse gases that earth has an
atmosphere, and all life on earth (the entire biosphere) depends
upon it. The existence of a greenhouse effect is not the issue—the
issue is a matter of balance. (ii) Sunlight (solar radiation) is respon-
sible for all life and most of the energy transformations (wind,
clouds, precipitation) that take place on earth, as well as for carbon
uptake in the carbon cycle, since it is photosynthesis that drives
the carbon cycle, and the energy powering photosynthesis is sun-
light. Sunlight is also, as a consequence, responsible for all nutri-
tion supporting almost all life of every kind on earth. (iii) This
proposal is not in any real sense a corrective to the situation. The
increase in mean global temperature is due to less longwave radi-
ation being able to pass through the atmosphere back to space than
has previously been the case. The proposal would reduce the
amount of sunlight available to the biosphere—but the problem
of global warming is not a matter of too much sunlight entering
the biosphere. The problem is that too much of the energy of solar
radiation is ending up as trapped heat.
Let us see if we can use the examples of Soper’s model-making
of a model for DDT intervention and the example of model-making
carried out by the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) arm of the
USDA in the ﬁre ant program, to gain some insight on the quality
of model-making involved in this proposal. We know that, in his
model-making activity, Soper recognized that conditions differed
in different countries, and that each new application of his method
to a new region had to consider the special conditions there, as
well as the time and place of the new implementation. In his mod-
el-making, he tried to avoid speculation about the results of the
intervention and he avoided epistemic risk-taking. The USDA’s
model-making activity, carried out without proper regard for the
potential for danger, did not. Soper identiﬁed the goal of interest
(malaria eradication) appropriately and, in each particular applica-
tion of his method, focused on that, rather than on some other,
intermediary goal (e.g., mosquito eradication). The USDA did no
such thing; the USDA instead not only inappropriately identiﬁed
the goal it should pursue (eradicating the ﬁre ant), but chose a
method of implementing it that undermined the goal it should
have identiﬁed (ﬁre ant balance). Finally, Soper obtained advice
and funding from sources that had no ﬁnancial conﬂicts. In con-
trast, the USDA obtained funding from Congress and advice from
the very sources who stood to receive large ﬁnancial gains from
the use of the products they recommended the USDA purchase
using the appropriated taxpayer funds. (Daniel, 1990)
How does the proposal to inject sulfate aerosols into the atmo-
sphere fare in comparison? While its proponents acknowledge,
when pressed, that the risks are huge and the effects are not18 From Technology Assessment GAO-11-71 under ‘‘What GAO Found’’: ‘‘Climate enginee
advocating research to develop and evaluate the technologies believe that research on thes
case climate scenarios—but caution that the misuse of research could bring new risks. Gove
technology studies but also efforts to improve climate models and data.’’
19 ’’Next Generation of Advanced Climate Models Needed’’ 7 September 2012. Ne
newsitem.aspx?RecordID=13430.
20 Some modeling improvements for reﬂective aerosols have been developed since the qknown, it is still being claimed this geoengineering method be
viewed as a ‘‘Plan B.’’ (Victor, Morgan, Apt, Steinbruner, & Ricke,
2013). The model-making is scant on science, having for support
only sketchy anecdote and computational models never intended
for such a use. The climate prediction models are, on the account
of anyone who is qualiﬁed to judge, unsuited for designing inter-
ventions.18 (GAO, 2011) As sophisticated as they are computation-
ally speaking, the models are seriously lacking in many respects19
important to planning an intervention of this sort, and so will not
be informative tools for designing interventions such as this sulfate
aerosol project. In fact, aerosols are considered especially poorly cap-
tured by existing modeling techniques.20
‘‘Several types of forcings—most notably aerosols, land-use and
land-cover change, and modiﬁcations to biogeochemistry—
impact the climate system in nonradiative ways, in particular
by modifying the hydrological cycle and vegetation dynamics.
Aerosols exert a forcing on the hydrological cycle by modifying
cloud condensation nuclei, ice nuclei, precipitation efﬁciency,
and the ratio between solar direct and diffuse radiation
received.’’ (National Research Council, 2005)
Like the USDA’s model-making activity in designing its interven-
tions, the model-making for a model of intervention involving the
spraying of sulfate aerosols is proceeding in spite of the recognition
that there is not, and may never be, sufﬁcient understanding of the
complexities involved to properly design a model of intervention. In
fact, tests are being urged (by Salam, 2013, who interprets Victor
2013 as a call for small scale tests.)
Another comparison has to do with intellectual honesty. The
geoengineering activity being urged is currently presented as a re-
search activity (Victor et al., 2013), just as the USDA’s ﬁre ant pro-
gram was carried out under the arm of the Agricultural Research
Service (Daniel, 1990). The background to this is that actually,
the current state of things is that a ban on all but small-scale
experiments for research studies was agreed to at a UN Convention
on Biodiversity, so any real interventions would have to pitched as
such (Bracmort & Lattanzio, 2013; United Nations Environmental
Programme, 2012). The statement of the goal of the research activ-
ity is unsettling. Here is why: the statements in the call for exper-
iments involving the actual dispersal of sulfate aerosols are made
without appropriate qualiﬁcations of the sense of ‘‘could’’: in a re-
cent issue of Foreign Affairs, readers are told that ‘‘SRM technologies
could cool the planet in just a few months by tinkering with the
planet’s energy balance. [. . .] The clouds could deﬂect just enough
incoming sunlight to offset, crudely, the number of degrees human
emissions have warmed the planet.’’ (Victor et al., 2013) That same
article points out that ‘‘the science is missing.’’ Why, then, portray
the technology as one having such capabilities, when there is no
basis for claiming such a capability is possible, even in principle?
However the quoted statement was meant when written, the real-
ity is that such a statement exudes a conﬁdence about in-principle
attainable knowledge of the consequences of such actions (e.g.,
‘‘just enough’’; ‘‘the number of degrees’’) that is wholly unjustiﬁed.
The appeals are (at present, at least) only for small-scale experi-
mental tests, which, we are condescendingly told, ‘‘should not be
seen as the camel’s nose under the tent.’’ Unfortunately, seeking
permission for small-scale ﬁeld tests as a path to some (perhaps
other) researchers assuming authorization of much larger scalering technologies do not now offer a viable response to global climate change. Experts
e technologies is urgently needed or would provide an insurance policy against worst
rnment reports and the literature suggest that research progress will require not only
ws from the National Academies http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/
uoted work was published. (Andrews, Forster, Boucher, Bellouin, & Jones, 2010)
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ﬁre ant program and the propaganda that was used to garner sup-
port for it.
The geoengineering scheme for which the so-called ‘‘small-
scale tests’’ are supposed to be a test is presented as protection
for all from a dangerous hazard, just as the reckless and indiscrim-
inate spraying of pesticides was presented as protection of the en-
tire nation from a national threat (the invading (incoming) ﬁre ant)
using military rhetoric. The means used to employ the dispersion
of sulfate aerosols (aerial spraying) are such that, inasmuch as
any approval will be sought, it will be from a centralized body,
not from the individuals affected. Once permission is granted, or
some authorization for doing so is justiﬁed in some way, no agree-
ment will need to be sought from those affected, and, due to the
fact that the means used is aerial dispersal, refusal to participate
is not possible. This, too, was the approach taken in the model-
making activity for the model of intervention used by the USDA
in its broadcasting of pesticides in the Fire Ant Program. The rhe-
torical ploy of presenting the spraying of something in the skies
above, even something toxic, as a public good was used by the
USDA in its public relations campaigns, and appears, with little
modiﬁcation, in the almost ubiquitous, sometimes brazenly conﬁ-
dent, media portrayals of the potential beneﬁt of this geoengineer-
ing scheme (Wilsdon, 2012 is but one of many examples). Recently,
one of the scheduled tests was cancelled due to concerns that those
researching the scheme stood to beneﬁt commercially from public
adoption of the scheme.21 (Cartwright, 2012) This kind of concern
about the proposed geoengineering scheme, too, is reminiscent of
the USDA ﬁre ant program (Carson, 1962; Daniel, 1990).
One scientiﬁc issue common to the use of DDT and the imple-
mentation of the proposed geoengineering scheme deserves spe-
cial mention: the issue of ‘‘ﬂarebacks.’’ Rachel Carson pointed out
that indiscriminate broadcasting of potent pesticides could, long
term, make the problem worse due to ‘‘ﬂarebacks’’ of insect popu-
lations that followed the temporary reduction in their populations
effected by the pesticide. (Carson, 1962 I, p. 36; Carson, 1962 II, p.
74) The issue of ‘‘ﬂarebacks’’ is a key problem for this geoengineer-
ing scheme, too. For, the earth’s oceans, forests, rivers and atmo-
sphere are intimately interrelated and controlled by complicated
and subtle feedback mechanisms. Though the use of the phrase
‘‘cool the planet in just a few months’’ without immediate qualiﬁ-
cation and the innocuous-sounding ‘‘tinkering with the planet’s
energy balance’’ in the quote above from their article in Foreign Af-
fairs rhetorically distracts from this important disadvantage of the
scheme, it is not denied by any of the scientiﬁcally informed pro-
ponents calling for development of the scheme. The fact that
implementation of the scheme could make things much worse is
admitted, but simply viewed as one of those risks one must take
when faced with great hazards. (Spector, 2012) There is no scien-
tiﬁcally-grounded expectation that this problem (the climate ana-
logue of the ‘‘ﬂarebacks’’ experienced in the Fire Ant Program), is a
tractable problem.
In short, the proposed geoengineering scheme seems a case of
model-making that is very like the approach to model-making that
gave rise to the irresponsible and harmful USDA Fire Ant program
(authorization for which was obtained as a research program), and
not at all like the approach employed in Soper’s models of inter-
vention, which gave rise to the responsible use of DDT in his highly
effective malaria eradication programs, using methods widely re-
garded as appropriate even today. As in the Fire Ant Program, the
public is made to feel that the scheme presented is the only means
available; often methods aimed at achieving the same goal by21 The ‘‘planners announced that they have cancelled the test because of concerns that
(Cartwright, 2012)changes in land-use are simply excluded from the scope of a dis-
cussion or report on geoengineering. As with the Fire Ant Program,
however, other, more appropriate responses to the hazard are in
fact readily available. For the threat of global climate change, the
list might include:
(i) Forestation with trees that sequester carbon in the soil and
provide food, shade, and oil-producing nuts (e.g., drought-
resistant, fast-growing moringa trees) and allow for inter-
planting of crops or interplanting among homes in residen-
tial areas; (National Research Council, 2006, p. 246ff)
(ii) A switch from current farming practices to precision agricul-
ture and no-till agriculture, which produce much more veg-
etation for the same amount of water available and tend to
produce signiﬁcantly fewer emissions of greenhouse gases
(e.g., carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide);
(iii) Banning the ﬂaring of natural gas at oil wells, which is an
entirely wasteful and useless source of greenhouse gas emis-
sions (Clayton, 2012); and capture of methane emissions
from various waste streams;
(iv) The use of reﬂective poly-covered greenhouses instead of
open cropland, as currently practiced in the region around
Almeria, Spain, a practice which is thought to be responsible
for the decadal trend in reduction of regional temperatures
there (Campra, Garcia, Canton, & Palacios-Orueta, 2008);
(v) The installation of green roofs and green spaces to replace
energy absorbing asphalt roofs and asphalt lots.
Researchers on geoengineering refer to 10 billion US dollars per
year as ‘‘a mere pittance’’ (Victor et al., 2013); the question of what
that kind of investment might yield over even a few years if ap-
plied to the above alternatives, all of which have additional long-
lasting beneﬁts, and some of which even save money and make
much better use of environmental resources (e.g., water) in the
long term, begs for attention.
Space does not permit a discussion of those alternatives here,
however. What is relevant to the topic of this paper is that, like
Soper’s programs, and like the methods of dealing with ﬁre ants
that are now recognized as more appropriate, less harmful, and,
importantly, more effective than the ARS’s Fire Ant Program (Foil,
2010; Penn State Cooperative Extension, 2013), they are programs
implemented on a smaller, decentralized scale. The models of
interventions would need to be developed in the course of deter-
mining the particular needs for each case.
9. Moral perception and moral particularism
In the opening section of this paper, I said that I would explain
that I had come to seemodel-making in science as analogous to a cer-
tain accountofmoral perception in action.Whereasmoral philosophy
is concerned with questions of action or, put more generally, with
how one ought to live one’s life, our question about models in engi-
neering science here is concerned with questions of how a machine
is going to act or, put more generally, with how something in the
worldworks.What’s the connection between the two kinds of ques-
tions, the one in moral philosophy, and the one in engineering sci-
ence? In terminology moral philosophers often use: ‘‘what a
situation requires.’’ McDowell, for instance, in one place writes of
virtue as a sensitivity: ‘‘an ability to recognize requirements which
situations imposeonone’s behavior. It is a single complex sensitivity
of this sortwhichwe are aiming to instill whenwe aim to inculcate a
moral outlook.’’ (McDowell, 1979)researchers involved in the project could have a commercial interest in its success.’’
44 S.G. Sterrett / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 46 (2014) 31–45Moral particularists are noted for attending to the situational
aspects of morality, and most have been concerned to point out
the rational and objective aspects of knowing what is required in
a situation—to argue, ultimately, that one can make sense of the
claim that virtue is knowledge of a certain sort. Yet, according to
moral particularism, this ability need not involve the ability to
articulate principles about how one should act. (e.g., Dancy,
1983, 2004, 2009, 2010; McDowell, 1979; Wallace, 1996) Now,
behavior of machines is not moral behavior, of course. It is not
the points about what virtue is that interest us here. It is the points
that such moral philosophers have made about an agent’s ‘‘percep-
tion of a situation’’ that are of interest here, because those points
do apply to the human activity of model-making in engineering
science. The important thing is ‘‘getting it right.’’ For a virtuous
agent on the moral particularist account, to ‘‘get it right’’ requires
that one’s perception of a situation includes what’s relevant to
revealing what that situation requires of a virtuous agent; put an-
other way, it includes everything that determines how a virtuous
agent is required to respond in that situation. For a good model-
maker to ‘‘get it right’’ means for the model-maker’s perception
of a situation to include everything relevant to determining how
the machine will respond. (It’s an analogy between two different
kinds of necessity; lest anyone consider this difference an objection
to what I have just said, let me point out that just because there are
disanalogies between two things doesn’t mean there are not anal-
ogies to be drawn between them, too.)
If we are concerned with how a machine will respond, as we are
in engineering science, then we need to consider the machine sit-
uated in its relation to other things in the world. What those other
things are like, and how the machine is situated in relation to
them, are relevant to determining how the machine will respond.
This is the point made in Section 3 above: ‘‘An engineering model
is never a model of just a machine.’’ Yet, we did not on that account
throw up our hands and consider the problem of determining how
a machine would respond to be beyond human capabilities. Rather,
we noted that engineering science did contain a notion for model-
makers to use instead of the notion of a machine that answered to
this need: the notion of a system. We discussed the correct manner
of delineating system boundaries, so that the system properly ac-
counts for the presence of other things that affect its behavior. If
the system is not the same as a machine, though, we run into the
question of what else we can draw upon besides physical laws that
govern the behavior of a machine.
In Section 4, we noted something that is perhaps unexpected to
those who think of engineering as simply more detailed physics:
when we asked how far the net must be cast in identifying things
that must be speciﬁed in order to produce a design speciﬁcation for
a machine to ensure a certain behavior of a machine, we found that
the things that must be considered could include things that might
be considered subjects for political science: policies governing, and
habits of, humans. In Section 5, we then answered the question of
what we can use to analyze a system, for we noted that there was
an engineering practice that deals with this complexity of systems,
the study of physically similar systems. It differs from the approach
of using physical laws directly to solve an equation that describes
the behavior of interest, but physical laws are involved in that they
provide an objective means of saying whether two systems are22 Dancy makes the point (Dancy, 1983, p. 534) that the notion of general relevance of suc
like how relevance works in discussing physically similar systems; we point out a fact becau
it is only in the context of an entire system and a speciﬁed behavior of interest that a judgm
comparing cases are related to this point, in that the value of making such comparisons is n
with more insight.
23 It is important to Dancy’s view that features do not in and of themselves contribute to g
feature is relevant or not in a new case, and if so what exact role it is playing there (the ‘fo
claim emerges as the consequence of the core particularist doctrine, which we can call th
reason at all in another, or even a reason on the other side.’’ (Dancy, 2009)similar with respect to a certain kind of behavior (whether used
in reconstruction of an existing practice of categorizing systems
as similar that was learnt independently of knowing these physical
laws, or used explicitly in establishing criteria in order to establish
similarity of systems and thus categorize systems as similar). I
noted that, although the method is designed for use with quantita-
tive characterizations of a system, it might be extended or adapted
to qualitative characterizations of a system or situation. We might
look to it for a way to understand such things as ‘‘a good x or an
effective y, e.g., a good response to an opportunity or an effective
means of stimulating growth’’ in a way that does not require formu-
lating a principle or criterion of ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘effective’’, but, rather, in
terms of being able to say when two situations are similar with re-
spect to that qualitative feature. (This is on analogy to using the
methodology of physically similar systems to say if and when
two systems are similar with respect to a certain kind of behavior.)
Though I did not mention it in Section 5, the point about establish-
ing similarity of systems might be seen on analogy with some
points Dancy has made about the particularity of relevance.22
I then presented the example of how the problem of harvesting
energy from the wind was reconceived during the process of mod-
eling machines for doing so via perceiving similarities between
biological situations (ﬁsh swimming in schools) and an envisioned
windfarm, in Section 6. Here we saw a sort of symmetry with the
moral perception case (or, for those who understand what duality
in mathematics, a sort of dual to it). That is, whereas moral partic-
ularists have been concerned to show the knowledge involved in
moral perception, in that facts are involved in such perception,
here I am pointing out the sensitivity to moral aspects of a situa-
tion involved in model-making in engineering science. The sensi-
tivity to the moral aspects of consequences of using different
windmill designs likely did play some part in the creative process
described in Sections 6 and 7 that resulted in coming up with the
re-envisioned problem statement for windfarm design.
In Section 8, I pointed out that many technical issues involve
not just models of what is in the world that engineering science
methods are meant to deal with (machines, organisms, natural
processes) but models of interventions. These involve the human
activity of making a model, as before, but the models more explic-
itly highlight the actions of humans. We compared two examples
of human interventions on the environment using DDT, one of
which is now seen as bad, or inappropriate, the other which is re-
garded as good, and appropriate. I suggested, and showed how, we
might use an approach analogous to the method of similarity of
systems, to judge a current controversial proposal. Yet, this reason-
ing does not have quite the same status as in the engineering sci-
ence case, i.e., the status of an inductive inference. What status
does it have, then? Here I think the moral particularist’s view is
compatible with the methods I’ve discussed here: that, in giving
reasons for acting or judging something to be good, one is pointing
out features of a situation23 that help explain why that situation is a
good or desirable situation.
In pointing out that one situation is similar to another, we are
regarding one situation as a model of the other. When the subject
area is physical science, that is the methodology of physically sim-
ilar systems; I have been concerned to show that we use scientiﬁc
theories to establish such similarity between systems. In pointingh a feature does not make sense; only ‘‘relevance in a particular case’’ does. This is very
se it is relevant to showing that the behavior of two different systems is the same, and
ent of relevance would even make sense. The points made about lessons learned from
ot to discover or cite a principle that covers both cases, but to see each of the two cases
oodness or badness: ‘‘Features have, as we might put it, variable relevance. Whether a
rm’ that its relevance takes there) will be sensitive to other features of the case. This
e holism of reasons. This is the doctrine that what is a reason in one case may be no
S.G. Sterrett / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 46 (2014) 31–45 45out that a situation is similar to another with respect to the ways
that are relevant to it being good or desirable, we may be expand-
ing from the subject matter of physical relations and physical the-
ories, but, it seems to me, we are doing so by using an extended
notion of the method of physically similar systems.
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